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Defined Value Clauses and
Fair Market Value
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Hendrix1 the Tax Court once again considered
whether defined value clauses were the result of
arm’s-length transactions and whether they were
void as against public policy.2 The underlying dis-
pute was whether the taxpayers’ transfers of the
John H. Hendrix Co. (JHHC) stock were valued at
fair market value.
In 1996 the taxpayers’ attorney suggested that
they change the structure of JHHC to an S corpora-
tion for tax reasons, and in connection with the
company’s preferred stock redemption, he sug-
gested an appraisal firm to value the stock.3
Around 1999, the taxpayers consulted their attor-
ney about making gifts of JHHC stock to their three
daughters in trust and to a charitable entity. Because
of the difficulty in valuing the stock, the attorney
advised the taxpayers to use a defined value clause
to fix the value of their stock transfers for federal
gift tax purposes. He also recommended that they
create a donor-advised fund at a community non-
profit organization. Accordingly, the taxpayers se-
lected the Greater Houston Community Foundation
to administer their fund. Although they had not
previously been involved with that foundation, the
taxpayers desired to help local and statewide chari-
table needs.4
The taxpayers’ attorney told the foundation that
his clients would be making a large charitable
donation consisting of (1) $20,000 to create a donor-
advised fund and (2) JHHC nonvoting stock. The
foundation had a protocol on donations of hard-to-
value property.5 During the following three months,
the parties negotiated their agreement to create a
donor-advised fund. Also, the taxpayers’ attorney
sent the foundation a draft assignment agreement
and a dispute resolution and buy-sell agreement.
The draft explained that the taxpayers would give
JHHC stock to the foundation and make a part-gift,
part-sale transfer of JHHC stock to their daughters’
trusts. The foundation’s attorney returned the as-
signment agreement in November 1999 together
with an attached rider addressing JHHC’s duty to
pay income in a timely manner.6
The taxpayers rehired their attorney’s appraiser
to value the transferred stock. The appraisal firm
valued the stock based on the earlier redemption
value and on the company’s accounts and tax
documents. Each taxpayer then determined gifts of
$50,000 of the nonvoting stock to the foundation,
$10.5 million to a generation-skipping trust, and
$4.2 million to an issue trust that benefited the
daughters. Those trusts were created by the tax-
payers near the end of 1999, with a Mr. Klein and
the taxpayers’ eldest daughter as trustees. The
following day the taxpayers partitioned their com-
munity property interests in the JHHC nonvoting
stock so that each thereby owned 403,241.85 shares.7
On December 31, 1999, the taxpayers, the
trustees, and the foundation executed an assign-
ment agreement to assign irrevocably 287,619.64
shares of the stock to the generation-skipping trust
and to the foundation. The three agreements con-
tained a defined value clause. Reciting the defini-
tion of FMV from the regulations,8 the agreements
transferred $10.5 million of stock to the trusts for
1Hendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-133, Doc 2011-
13144, 2011 TNT 116-13.
2Id. at 2.
3Id. at 3.
4Id. at 4-5.
5Id. at 5.
6Id. at 6.
7Id. at 6-7.
8See reg. section 20.2031-1(b).
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the taxpayers’ daughters, and any remaining shares
were assigned to the foundation for the benefit of
the donor-advised fund.9
Each trust was required to pay its proportionate
share of gift tax from the transfer, and the trustees
were required to sign promissory notes to pay each
of the taxpayers approximately $9 million. Also, the
taxpayers each signed another set of assignment
agreements similar to those above, but transferring
115,622.21 shares of stock to the issue trust and to
the foundation, with the stock value fixed at $4.2
million and with the trustees obligated to execute
promissory notes for $3.6 million to each taxpayer.10
The assignment agreement gave the transferees
the right to allocate the shares, and the dispute
resolution and buy-sell agreement required any
dispute about FMV to be resolved by arbitration,
failing an agreement among the parties. On the
same date as the assignment agreement, the trustees
delivered the requisite promissory notes, and the
taxpayers executed documents naming the trusts
and the foundation as tenants-in-common owners
of the transferred stock.11
The taxpayers’ attorney negotiated the trusts’
proposed confirmation agreements for the stock
transfers, and the trustees hired the same appraisal
firm previously recommended to the taxpayers. The
firm appraised the FMV of the shares at $36.66 per
share on December 31, 1999. The taxpayers’ attor-
ney sent that appraisal to the foundation and its
attorney on April 12, 2000. Consistent with its
practice of requiring an independent review of
appraisals, the foundation retained its own ap-
praiser, who on or about May 8, 2000, found the
taxpayers’ appraisal to be ‘‘reasonable and fair.’’12
On their gift tax returns for 1999, filed on April
12, 2000, each taxpayer claimed a gift of $1.4 million
and a charitable deduction of $50,000.13
In June 2000 the foundation and the trustees
concluded their confirmation agreement with an
effective date of December 31, 1999, applying the
$36.66-per-share FMV from the appraisal.14 The
taxpayers and the government agreed that if a final
decision of the case resulted in the court’s rejection
of the defined value clauses in the assignment
agreements, the share values would be based on a
per-share value of $48.60, multiplied by the number
of shares allocated to each transferee under the
confirmation agreement.15
The taxpayers contended that the parties’ trans-
action was at arm’s length and that the formula
clauses were used to set a value for a difficult-to-
value asset. The taxpayers therefore asserted that
the transferred share values were $36.66 per share
and that their charitable deduction was $100,000.
The government maintained that the defined value
clauses were invalid because they were not the
result of arm’s-length negotiations and were con-
trary to public policy. The government concluded
that the taxpayers transferred stock at $48.60 per
share and that their charitable deduction was there-
fore limited to $66,284.57.16
The court considered who should bear the bur-
den of proof. Both parties agreed that the govern-
ment should bear the burden regarding the validity
of the defined value clauses. Because the taxpayers
agreed to deduct only a total of $50,000 as a
charitable gift, the court held that the question of
the valuation of the charitable deduction was ren-
dered moot.17
The court started by explaining that the case was
appealable to the Fifth Circuit and that under the
Golsen18 rule, McCord19 governed the holding in the
instant case, with the exception of the two issues the
government was arguing — whether the defined
value clauses were the result of arm’s-length trans-
actions and whether they were void as contrary to
public policy. The court observed that the defined
value clause in McCord, which was tied to gifts of
limited partnership interests to family members
and to charities, was ‘‘nearly identical to the one
here.’’20 The McCord assignment agreement also
referred to the FMV definition in the regulations.
The donees were to allocate percentage interests
in the company, but the donors did not participate
in that decision. The appraisal firm used in McCord
was the same one used here. Although the McCord
charity did not hire its own appraiser to review the
appraisal, its officers and their outside counsel
expressed confidence in the taxpayers’ appraiser
and his firm, found his method and service appro-
priate, and accepted his valuation.21 The donees
used that computation to apportion their partner-
ship interests.
The Tax Court held against the McCords, and the
Fifth Circuit reversed. In its decision, the appellate
9Id. at 8.
10Id. at 8-9.
11Id. at 9.
12Id. at 10.
13Id.
14Id. at 10-11.
15Id. at 11.
16Id. at 11-12.
17Id. at 12-13.
18Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir. 1971).
19Succession of McCord v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir.
2006), Doc 2006-15992, 2006 TNT 164-11, rev’g 120 T.C. 358 (2003),
Doc 2003-12175, 2003 TNT 94-10.
20Hendrix, T.C. Memo. 2011-133, at 14.
21McCord, 461 F.3d at 620.
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court noted that the government had initially relied
on the rationale that the defined value clause vio-
lated public policy but that it had waived that
doctrine on appeal.22 Because the Fifth Circuit did
not address the government’s public policy argu-
ment or decide whether there was an arm’s-length
transaction, McCord did not control the Tax Court’s
consideration of those issues in Hendrix,23 but the
court still held for the taxpayers on both ques-
tions.24
The court explained that to conclude that the
taxpayers’ transactions were not at arm’s length, it
would have to find ‘‘credible evidence that the
parties colluded or had side deals or that the form
of the transactions otherwise differed from the
substance.’’25 That the taxpayers and their daugh-
ters were close and the transaction benefited the
daughters ‘‘does not necessarily mean that the
formula clauses failed to be reached at arm’s
length,’’ the court said.26 Likewise, there is no
requirement that there be negotiations or adverse
interests among the parties for the court to find that
the transaction was at arm’s length. The court noted
that as buyers in the transaction, the daughters
sustained a risk that the stock might be overval-
ued.27 Further, the court refused to find collusion
between the taxpayers and the foundation because
the charity could lose its tax exemption if it failed to
exercise due diligence regarding the gift and be-
cause it had used its own appraiser to review the
taxpayers’ appraisal.28 Moreover, the foundation
required that the taxpayers pay all taxes and pen-
alties ‘‘if JHHC failed to distribute sufficient income
to pay those taxes,’’ and the foundation had a
fiduciary duty to ensure that it received the full
value it was entitled to receive under the defined
value clauses.29
Finally, the court held that the defined value
clauses were not void as against public policy.
According to the court, those clauses would not
‘‘severely and immediately frustrate sharply de-
fined national or State policies proscribing certain
conduct.’’30 Rather, the court found that the defined
value clauses assisted the public policy of encour-
aging charitable gifts. The court distinguished
Procter31 as a case involving a savings clause that (1)
deterred tax collection, (2) required the court to
decide a moot issue, and (3) ‘‘would reduce a
Federal court’s final judgment to a declaratory
judgment.’’32 By contrast, the formula clauses in
Hendrix had no condition subsequent that would
undermine the transfer. Moreover, the formula
clauses benefited a charity. The case was similar to
Christiansen,33 in which the court held that a defined
value disclaimer clause was not contrary to public
policy.34
Analysis and Conclusion
Under the Golsen rule, the Tax Court was bound
to decide Hendrix in line with the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in McCord. The two cases are factually
almost identical. Unfortunately, that means that
defined value clauses designed to produce valua-
tion distortions have once again been interpreted as
benign.
In McCord, the taxpayers transferred a greater
value to their children and grandchildren than the
stated amount under the assignment agreement,
and they received a larger charitable deduction than
the amount the charities ultimately received when
the donees, as anticipated, purchased the partner-
ship interests from them.35 In McCord, the charities
received approximately $500,000, which they would
not have received without ‘‘going along to get
along’’ with their wealthy donors.36 Indeed, as the
court noted in Hendrix, the experts in McCord did
22Id. at 623.
23Hendrix, T.C. Memo. 2011-133, at 16-17.
24Id. at 18, 22.
25Id. at 18.
26Id.
27Id. at 18-19.
28Id. at 19.
29Id. at 19-20.
30Id. at 20.
31Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
32Id. at 827.
33Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 1, 16-18
(2008), Doc 2008-1539, 2008 TNT 17-7, aff’d, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th
Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-25102, 2009 TNT 218-18.
34Id. at 21-22.
35In an earlier Tax Notes column, I contended:
Applying the total value of the donated partnership
interest, that is, the stated defined value clause plus the
donated amount equaling $9,883,832.54, and working
backwards, because the charity received only $479,008.55,
that excess value should have increased the value of the
donors’ gift to their children and grandchildren to
$9,404,824.56. That is, if the charity received only
$479,008, the donees actually received more than the
stated amount under the agreement. The donors received
an unwarranted charitable deduction of approximately
$2.5 million and their children and grandchildren netted
approximately an additional $2 million not subject to
transfer taxes. Logically, either the gift was greater than
the donors had stated it would be or the donors retained
that additional value. Because the extent of the donors’
transfer was fixed and not at issue, and because the
charity gained only $479,008 in a foreseeable transaction,
the donors must have transferred $9,404,824 to the do-
nees. [Citations omitted.]
Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘McCord and Postgift Events,’’ Tax Notes, Oct.
23, 2006, p. 349, Doc 2006-21031, 2006 TNT 205-41.
36McCord, 120 T.C. at 373, n.9 (‘‘Suffice it to say that, in the
long run, it is against the economic interest of a charitable
organization to look a gift horse in the mouth’’).
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not hire their own valuation experts. They ‘‘never
obtained a separate and independent appraisal of
their interests.’’37 However, neither did the founda-
tion in Hendrix; its appraiser merely reviewed the
taxpayers’ appraisal for approval.38 That is different
from having your own expert independently ap-
praise the donated property.39 In both Hendrix and
McCord, it is equally questionable ‘‘why a charity
would ever want to receive a minority limited
partnership interest, but for an understanding that
this interest would be redeemed quickly for cash,
and find relevant that the interest was subject to the
call provision that could be exercised at any time.’’40
In Hendrix, moreover, the Tax Court went further
than applying Golsen. The court rejected the govern-
ment’s public policy argument at least in part on the
ground that the defined value clauses encourage
charitable gifts. But there is one major problem with
that statement: Defined value clauses primarily
promote private benefit to the donors in contraven-
tion of American Bar Endowment.41 Through the use
of a charitable conduit, the taxpayers pass a greater
value to their children without properly assessed
transfer taxes.42
By discouraging the government’s incentive to
audit the taxpayers’ returns, the defined value
clauses in both McCord and Hendrix impede an
accurate valuation of the transferors’ taxable gifts to
their family and their donations to the charities.
Procter should have controlled the result in both
these cases.
37Id. at 430 (Laro, J., joined by Vasquez, J., dissenting).
38Although the Tax Court states that the charity performed
its own independent appraisal, earlier the court describes its
‘‘independent appraisal’’ as reviewing the taxpayers’ expert’s
appraisal. See Hendrix, at 10 and 19.
39Noteworthy is the fact that the taxpayers agreed with the
government that if the court rejected the taxpayers’ per share
appraisal of $36.66, the per share figure should be valued at
$48.60, resulting not only in a lower charitable deduction but
also, more significantly, a much higher value transferred to the
non-charitable beneficiaries and thus an undervaluation of
assets subject to gift tax. See discussion and accompanying notes
12-16, supra.
40Id. In Christiansen, in contrast to McCord and Hendrix,
because the court disallowed the family limited partnership
discounts, the taxpayers transferred the partnership’s underly-
ing assets, which had easily verified FMVs, to both non-
charitable and charitable beneficiaries. Because those
transferred assets were liquid assets, the defined value clause
could not result in sleight-of-hand valuation distortions that
they were intended to create for a nonmarketable FLP interest.
See Gerzog, ‘‘Disclaimers and Defined Value Clauses: Chris-
tiansen,’’ Tax Notes, Apr. 7, 2008, p. 91, Doc 2008-5881, or 2008
TNT 68-51.
41United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-118
(1986) (‘‘Where a taxpayer receives a benefit of equal value for
his donation, he is ineligible for a charitable contribution
deduction’’). Although the issue of the value of the charitable
deduction was rendered moot in Hendrix because the taxpayers
agreed to a much lower charitable deduction value, defined
value clauses in this context will inevitably lead to overvalua-
tions of a charitable deduction, which is contrary to public
policy.
42I have argued that ‘‘when a taxpayer seeks to use the tax
system to benefit from her charitable gift in addition to the tax
benefit derived from a commensurate charitable deduction,
quid pro quo and the examination of donative intent should be
expanded to encompass the consequences to the alleged donor,
the charity, and the government.’’ See Gerzog, ‘‘From the Greedy
to the Needy,’’ 87 Ore. L. Rev. 1133, 1137 (2009).
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